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Statement of Issues and Standards of Review 
The legal issues asserted by Appellant Steven R. Kemp in this appeal have all 
been rejected by this Court in recent cases addressing the securitization of promissory 
notes. In addition, Mr. Kemp's claims fail because he lacks standing to challenge the 
transfer and securitization of the promissory notes at issue in this case. 
In May of 2007, Mr. Kemp borrowed substantial amounts of money from Wells 
Fargo to purchase a luxury home in Kaysville, Utah. In order to borrow the money, Mr. 
Kemp executed two promissory notes ("Notes") memorializing the loans from Appellee 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo"). The Notes were respectively secured by two 
corresponding trust deeds ("Trust Deeds"). Sometime after the Notes were executed they 
were pooled with other notes and transferred to a securitized trust. Appellee HSBC Bank 
USA, National Association is the trustee for the trust in which the Notes were transferred 
("Trustee" collectively with Wells Fargo "Appellees"). After the transfer and 
securitization of the Notes, Mr. Kemp continued to make payments on the Notes. Mr. 
Kemp was current on the Notes at the time the Complaint was filed. Mr. Kemp now 
claims that as a result of the transfer and securitization of the Notes that he does not know 
who the present owner of the Notes is and that the Trust Deeds were severed from the 
Notes when they were transferred and securitized. As a result, Mr. Kemp argues that 
should he fail to make the payments on the Notes that the Appellees would not have the 
right to place him in default, accelerate the loans and foreclose on the home as allowed 
by the Notes and the Trust Deeds. In essence, Mr. Kemp seeks relief from a contract 
which he freely entered based solely upon a legal theory that has been expressly rejected 
by this Court. 
15374496 "• 
Issue 1: Whether the transfer or securitization of a promissory note into a 
securitized trust and securitizing the promissory note severs the promissory note from the 
trust deed that secures the promissory note and affects the covenants, duties and rights of 
the parties to the promissory note and corresponding trust deed? 
Standard of Review: The standard of review for a trial court decision on a 
motion to dismiss and for questions of statutory interpretation is whether the trial court's 
decision was correct. Turner v. Staker & Parson Companies, 2012 UT 30 f7, 708 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 28 (May 15, 2012); citing State v. Arave, 2011 UT 84, % 25, 268 P.3d 163; and 
State v. Parduhn, 2011 UT 57, f 16. 266 P.3d 765. 
Issue 2: Whether a borrower on a promissory note has standing to challenge the 
transfer and securitization of that note when the borrower is not a party to the transfer or 
securitization and he is unable to demonstrate any potential harm as a result of the 
transfer and securitization? 
Standard of Review: Whether Mr. Kemp has standing is a jurisdictional question 
and because standing is being challenged prior to discovery it will be considered for 
correctness. Brown v. Division of Water Rights of Department of Natural Resources, 
2009UT48,1f7,2l4P.3d95. 
Issue 3: Whether a borrower on a promissory note is estopped from challenging 
the transfer or securitization of that note after making payments pursuant to the terms of 
the note after the note is transferred or securitized? 
Standard of Review: Same as Issue 1. 
Determinative Provisions 
Determinative provisions are (R. 412, 437-439) of the record. 
15374496 9 
Statement of the Case 
I. Nature of the Case 
The issues raised by Mr. Kemp and his attorney in this matter have been decided 
by this Court on at least three previous occasions. Each time this Court has denied the 
exact legal arguments raised by similarly situated borrowers. At issue in this appeal is 
whether or not a promissory note that is secured by a trust deed continues to be secured 
after the note has been transferred to a mortgage-backed securitization trust and 
securitized. This Court has previously determined that the note continues to be secured 
and that the terms of the trust deed are enforceable. Mr. Kemp argues that he has 
standing to challenge the securitization and then challenge whether the trust deed still 
provides any security for the note, whether the borrower is still required to make 
payments pursuant to the terms of the note and whether the holder of the note, through its 
nominee, may declare the note in default and foreclose under the terms of the trust deed 
should the borrower fail to make his payments. Mr. Kemp's counsel has twice brought 
these exact arguments before this Court. Both times, and in an additional case not 
involving Mr. Kemp's current counsel, this Court has rejected those arguments. It should 
do the same here and affirm. 
II. Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
A. Mr. Kemp Executed Two Promissory Notes Secured by Two Separate 
Trust Deeds in Exchange for the Funds to Purchase a Home. 
On or about May 1, 2007, Mr. Kemp obtained two loans from Wells Fargo in the 
combined amount of $621,900.00 (the "Loans") for the purchase of a home located at 
1491 Johnson Way, Kaysville, Utah 84037 (the "Property"). (R.6.) To memorialize the 
15374496 "> 
Loans, Mr. Kemp executed two promissory notes in favor of Wells Fargo (the "Notes") 
requiring Mr. Kemp to repay the debt. (R. 6, 412-414, 437-443.) Mr. Kemp also 
executed two deeds of trust encumbering the Property and securing Mr. Kemp's 
obligations under the Notes (the "Trust Deeds"). (R. 6, 417-435, 445-449.) 
The Notes identify the method and location of payment. (R. 412, 437-438.) In the 
Notes, Mr. Kemp specifically covenanted to make payments in a certain amount and to a 
certain location until the amount of the note was paid off: 
PAYMENTS 
(A) Time and Place of Payments 
I will make a payment every month on the first day of each 
month beginning June 1, 2007, before first fully amortizing 
principal and interest payment due date, my monthly 
payments will be only for the interest due on the unpaid 
principal of the Note. The due date of my first payment 
including fully amortizing principal and interest is the first 
day of June 2007. 
I will make these payments every month until I have paid all 
of the principal and interest and any other charges described 
below that I owe under the this Note. 
Each monthly payment will be applied as of its scheduled due 
date and if the payment consists of both principal and interest, 
it will be applied interest before Principal. If, on May 1, 
2037,1 still owe amounts under this Note, I will pay those 
amounts in full on that date, which is called the "Maturity 
Date". 
I will make my monthly payments at Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 
P.O. Box 11701, Newark, NJ 07101 -4701 or a different place 
if required by the Note Holder. 
(R.412.) 
15374496 
MY PROMISE TO PAY 
In return for a loan that I have received (the "Loan"), I 
Promise to pay $69,100.00 (this amount is called "Principal"), 
plus interest, to the order of the Bank. I understand that the 
Bank may transfer this Note. I will make all payments under 
this Note in U.S. Dollars. 
I will pay monthly payments of Principle and interest on the 
18th day of each month beginning on 06-18-2007. My 
monthly payment will be in the amount of U.S. $490.36. 
I will make payments at the Bank's address indicated on my 
payment coupon or my billing statement, unless another 
payment method is authorized by the Bank. Each non-
electric payment I make will be accompanied by the 
remittance portion of my billing statement or payment 
coupon. 
I understand that payments I make by mail to the address 
indicated on my billing statement or payment coupon will be 
credited to my Loan as of the date received (including 
Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays) if the Bank receives the 
payment prior to 5 p.m. local time for the payment address. 
(R. 437-438.) 
The Notes specifically contemplate the possibility that they can be transferred or 
sold at any time. (R. 412, 437-439; "I understand that the Lender may transfer this Note. 
The Lender or anyone who takes this Note by transfer and who is entitled to receive 
payments under this Note is called the 'Note Holder'." "I understand that the Bank may 
transfer this Note.") The Notes were transferred to the Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed 
Securities 2007-8 Trust, for which HSBC Bank is the Trustee. (R. 8.) At the time of the 
filing of the lawsuit, Mr. Kemp was current on the loan. (R. 9.) As a result, the Wells 
Fargo Defendants have not initiated judicial or non-judicial foreclosure against the 
Property or even accelerated the loan. (R. 9.) 
B. The District Court Rejects Mr. Kemp's Claim that the Trust Deeds No 
Longer Secure the Promissory Notes 
On May 27, 2011, Mr. Kemp filed the Complaint asking the Court to determine 
that the Notes were no longer secured by the Trust Deeds and that the Appellees did not 
have a claim to the Property. (R. 1.) Through his Complaint, Mr. Kemp attempted to 
wipe out the Appellees' security interest in the Property and their right to "collect 
payments on the subject loans." (R. 10, 12.) Specifically, Mr. Kemp sought a 
declaration that the Appellees "as a result of [the transfer of the Notes into the Trust] as 
securities, the [Appellees]...lack any interest in the subject debt or the subject realty, and 
may not collect payments on the subject loans." (R. 10.) Mr. Kemp further sought to 
have the Court declare that the Appellees lack the authority to accelerate the loan in case 
of default, negotiate a modification to the loan, declare a default and foreclose on the 
Property and issue a trustee's deed. (R. 10.) And finally, Mr. Kemp sought an order 
"quieting title in the subject property in [Mr. Kemp] and against [Appellees], including 
those served by publication freeing title to the subject property of the lien of the 
respective Trust Deeds and leaving any debt unsecured by any interest in the subject 
property." (R. 12.) 
After Mr. Kemp filed his Complaint, this Court issued a decision rejecting the 
exact arguments Mr. Kemp makes here. As a result, Appellees filed a motion to dismiss 
Mr. Kemp's complaint based, in part, on this Court's decision in Commonwealth 
Property Advocates v. MERS., 2011 UT App 232, fflflO, 13, 263 P.2d 397. (R. 508.) At 
the December 14, 2011 hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, the trial court and counsel for 
both parties discussed this Court's MERS decision and this Court's decision in 
Commonwealth Property Advocates v. U.S. Bank National Association, 2011 UT App 
415 T|4. (R. 683:27:7.) The operative holding of these decisions being that "the 
securitization of a note secured by a trust deed does not on its own alter the rights, 
obligations or enforceability of the trust deed." U.S. Bank, 2011 UT App 415 f 4. The 
trial court entered an order on January 13, 2012 granting the Appellees' Motion to 
Dismiss. (See R 664-665.) The trial court's decision was based upon this Court's 
MERS and U.S. Bank decision, two decisions where the borrower was represented by 
Mr. Kemp's current counsel and two decisions that rejected the exact legal arguments 
that are being made again as part of this appeal. 
Summary of Argument 
This Court should affirm the trial court's decision because the issues raised by Mr. 
Kemp have previously been considered and rejected by this Court. Mr. Kemp's claims 
fail on three separate grounds. 
First, this Court has repeatedly held that the securitization of promissory notes 
does not separate the promissory notes from the trust deeds securing those notes and does 
not affect the enforceability of the either the Notes or the Trust Deeds. Because Mr. 
Kemp's claims for declaratory relief and quiet title rest upon this legal argument, the trial 
correctly dismissed Mr. Kemp's claims as a matter of law. 
Second, Mr. Kemp does not have standing to challenge the transfer or 
securitization of the Notes. In fact, unlike the other borrowers who have brought these 
same legal arguments before this Court, Mr. Kemp is not in default on his home and 
according to his own Complaint, there is no basis to believe that he will lose the home. 
Finally, Mr. Kemp is estopped from complaining about the securitization of the 
Notes because he has continued to pay on the Notes. 
For these reasons, as set forth below in detail, this court should affirm the 
dismissal of Mr. Kemp's complaint. 
Argument 
This Court has already decided that the transfer of the Notes into a mortgage-
backed security trust and the securitization of the Notes do not sever the Notes from the 
Trust Deeds or change the covenants, obligations and rights found in the Notes and Trust 
Deeds. Moreover, Mr. Kemp lacks standing to even challenge the transfer the Notes, is 
bound to abide by the terms of the Notes, and is estopped from arguing otherwise. As a 
result, there is no basis for a court to issue a declaratory judgment adjusting Mr. Kemp's 
and Appellee's rights under the Notes or Trust Deeds or quiet title to the Property in Mr. 
Kemp's favor. 
I. Plaintiff's Claims Fail as a Matter of Law Because the Securitization of the 
Notes Did Not Sever them From the Trust Deeds. 
This Court should affirm the dismissal of Mr. Kemp's claims for declaratory 
judgment and quiet title because, as this Court has repeatedly held, the transfer and 
securitization of the Notes does not affect the covenants, obligations or rights of Mr. 
Kemp or Appellees under the Notes. 
A. As This Court has Repeatedly Held, Securitization Does not Sever the Note 
from the Trust Deed. 
This Court has previously held that the securitization of the Notes does not nullify 
the covenants and obligations in the Notes that Mr. Kemp voluntarily made to obtain the 
money to purchase his home. Nor does securitization somehow sever the Trust Deeds 
from the Notes. "The securitization of a note secured by a trust deed does not on its own 
alter the rights, obligations or enforceability of the trust deed." Commonwealth Property 
Advocates v. U.S. Bank National Association, 2011 UT App 415 Tf4. This Court has 
further held that "a transfer of an obligation secured by a mortgage also transfers the 
mortgage unless the parties to the transfer agree otherwise." Howard v. PNC Mortgage, 
2012 UT App 19,1}5, 269 P.3d 995 (per curiam); quoting Commonwealth Property 
Advocates v. MERS, 2011 UT App 232, Iff 10, 13, 263 P.2d 397. 
This Court's decisions are in line with the Utah statute that governs the transfer of 
secured debt instruments. Utah Code Ann § 57-1-35 states, "[t]he transfer of any debt 
secured by a trust deed shall operate as a transfer of the security therefore." Interpreting 
this statute, this Court opined, "[t]he statute does not invalidate any contractual rights or 
authority granted in a trust deed but rather simply 'describes the long-applied principle in 
our jurisprudence that when a debt is transferred, the underlying security continues to 
secure the debt."' Bank National Association, 2011 UT App 415 [^4; quoting MERS, 
2011 UT App 232, f^ 13. The statute does not interfere with the ability of the original 
parties to a note and a trust deed to "validly contract at the outset 'to have someone other 
than the beneficial owner of the debt act on behalf of that owner to enforce rights granted 
in [the security instrument].'" Id (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
Mr. Kemp failed to plead any facts specific to this case that limited Wells Fargo's 
ability to transfer the Notes or limited the subsequent transferees' rights to securitize the 
Notes. As this Court has previously held, "because securitization on its own does not 
alter the rights, obligations, or enforceability of a trust deed, a litigant must plead facts 
specific to his case that demonstrate that the documents at issue in the case do not allow 
securitization of the note." Howard v. PNC Mortgage, 2012 UT App 19 Tf5, 269 P.3d 995 
(per curiam). In this case, both Notes specifically allowed Wells Fargo to transfer the 
Notes and nothing prohibited Wells Fargo or any assignee from securitizing the Notes. 
(R. 412, 437-439.) Thus, Mr. Kemp's arguments have been rejected by this Court's 
recent precedent and this Court should affirm dismissal of Mr. Kemp's claims for 
declaratory judgment and quiet title. 
B. Mr. Kemp Is Not Entitled to a Declaratory Judgment Affecting the 
Appellees' Interest in the Property 
In his First Cause of Action, Mr. Kemp seeks a declaration that "as a result of such 
transfers of the respective debts as securities," the Appellees do not hold any interest in 
the Property or Loan; cannot collect payments on the Loan; cannot accelerate the Loan; 
cannot execute a loan modification, and cannot foreclose on the Property in the event of 
Mr. Kemp's default. (R. 10.) Under Utah Code Ann. §78B-6-401, a declaratory 
judgment must be predicated on a determination of rights, status, or other legal relations. 
In this case, the parties' status and respective rights are reflected in the Notes and the 
Trust Deeds, and there is no basis for supplementing or changing those rights by way of a 
court-issued declaration. As discussed above, the Appellees have not lost their interest in 
the Notes or rights under the Trust Deeds by virtue of securitization of the Notes. Mr. 
Kemp is not entitled to a free house because Wells Fargo transferred the Notes to a 
securitized trust and the Notes were securitized. Therefore, this Court should affirm 
dismissal of Mr. Kemp's First Cause of Action for declaratory judgment. 
C. Mr. Kemp's Quiet Title Claim Fails Because Appellees Have a Legitimate 
Interest in the Property. 
Mr. Kemp seeks in his Second Cause of Action to quiet title in the Property. Mr. 
Kemp requests an order that would "free[] title to the subject property of the lien of the 
respective Trust Deeds and leav[e] any debt unsecured by any interest in the subject 
property." (R. 12.) However, Mr. Kemp cannot prevail in a quiet title action because he 
must demonstrate "the strength of [his] own claim to title and not the [alleged] weakness 
of a defendant's title or even its total lack of title." Collard v. Nagle Constr., 2002 UT 
App 306, % 18, 57 P.3d 603 (quoting Church v. Meadow Springs Ranch Corp., 659 P.2d 
1045, 1048-49 (Utah 1983)). Mr. Kemp's quiet title claim does not (and cannot) 
establish his own claim, but instead seeks exclusively to attack the Appellees' interest, 
and so it must be rejected. Moreover, and more importantly, Mr. Kemp has not presented 
a plausible basis for challenging the Appellees' security interest in the Property. For 
these reasons, this Court should also affirm the dismissal of Mr. Kemp's Second Cause of 
Action for quiet title. 
II. Mr. Kemp Does Not Have Standing to Challenge the Securitization of the 
Note. 
Mr. Kemp's claims also fail as a matter of law because Mr. Kemp lacks standing 
to challenge the transfer and securitization of the Notes. Mr. Kemp lacks standing for 
two separate reasons. First, Mr. Kemp may not challenge the transfer and securitization 
of the Notes because he is not a party to the transfer. Second, Mr. Kemp has never 
explained how he has been or could possibly be damaged by the securitization of the 
Notes. 
"Standing is a jurisdictional requirement that must be satisfied before a court may 
entertain a controversy between two parties." Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, ^ 12, 154 
P.3d 808. Generally, "only those who are a party to a contract have a legally protectable 
interest in that contract." City of Grantsville, v. Redevelopment Agency of Tooele City, 
2010 UT 38, Tfl4 (citations omitted). Indeed, it is generally accepted that "a litigant who 
is not a party to an assignment lacks standing to challenge assignment of a note." Turner 
v. Lerner, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41364 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 11, 2011) (unpublished) 
(internal citations omitted); see also Ifert v. Miller, 138 B.R. 159 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992) 
("[Obligor] has no more right than a complete stranger to raise [Assignor's] rights under 
the assignment contract."). 
Courts have specifically prohibited borrowers from challenging transfers of notes 
by note holders. See Breus v. McGriff, 413 S.E. 2d 538, 539 (Ct. App. Ga. 1991) 
("[Borrowers] are strangers to the assignment contract between [original note holder] and 
[transferee note holder] and thus have no standing to challenge its validity."); Turner v. 
Lerner, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41364 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 11, 2011) ("[I]t is generally 
accepted law that a litigant who is not a party to an assignment lacks standing to 
challenge assignment of a note.") (unpublished) (internal citations omitted); Stein v. U.S. 
Bancorp, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18357 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 24, 2011) (borrowers lacked 
standing to challenge assignment of their mortgage); Chesnev v. Pioneer Sugar Co., 73 
Utah 293, 297 (Utah 1928) (noting "well-settled principle that the maker of a note cannot 
defeat an action thereon upon the grounds that the payee or some subsequent holder, who 
was a corporation, negotiated the same in an ultra vires transaction.55). Mr. Kemp was not 
a party to the transfers of the Notes and therefore may not challenge those transfers. 
Moreover, Mr. Kemp specifically granted Wells Fargo Defendants and subsequent note 
holders the right to transfer the Notes. (SeeR.412,438.) 
Mr. Kemp also lacks standing because he has been unable to demonstrate any 
recognizable injury. A party only has standing to bring a suit if he can identify an injury 
that was caused by the defendant and that is redressable by the court. Brown v. Div. of 
Water Rights, 2010 UT 14, f 18, 228 P.3d 747. Utah law requires the injury to be an 
"actual or potential injury.55 See Cedar Mountain EnvtL Inc. v. Tooele Cnty., 2009 UT 
48,19, 214 P.3d 95; see also Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 
2006 UT 74, f 23, 148 P.3d 960. Moreover, a quiet title action requires a dispute over 
"rights, interest, or claims to or in personal or real property55; and an action for 
declaratory relief must be predicated on a dispute over rights, status, or other legal 
relations. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-6-1301, 78B-6-401 (2010). 
Mr. Kemp failed to identify an actual injury—or even potential injury—caused by 
the Appellees. Mr. Kemp alleges that he "has paid the loans current to the present date, 
and will continue to do so." (R.9.) In fact, Mr. Kemp admits that "to date, no person, 
purporting to be the owners of the respective subject debts or otherwise, has taken any of 
the steps required by the respective Notes to accelerate any loan as a prerequisite to 
foreclosure of any Trust Deed." Id. Mr. Kemp does not allege that he is losing his 
property or that he could lose his property through foreclosure. His rights or interests are 
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not at risk under the facts presented. Rather than asking the Court to protect his interest 
in the property from foreclosure or some other threatened harm, Mr. Kemp would like 
this Court to issue a ruling that he is entitled to a windfall in the form of unsecured Notes 
and no more loan payments. (R. 10.) Mr. Kemp's failure to show any potential injury in 
this matter is reason enough to affirm the trail court's decision. 
III. Mr. Kemp is Estopped From Challenging Securitization. 
Mr. Kemp's claims also fail as a matter of law because he is estopped from 
objecting to the transfer and securitization of the Notes because Mr. Kemp made 
payments to the subsequent note holders after the Notes were securitized. To prove 
estoppel, the Appellees need only show that "(i) a statement, admission, act, or failure to 
act by one party [is] inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (ii) reasonable action or 
inaction by the other party taken or not taken on the basis of the first party's statement, 
admission, act, or failure to act; and (iii) injury to the second party that would result from 
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act, or 
failure to act." Ceco. Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah 
1989) (citations omitted). As the Breus court explained, "regardless of whether there had 
been a proper assignment of the [note] to [a subsequent note holder], such as would 
legally bind [Mr. Kemp] , . . . [Mr. Kemp] will not now be heard to complain of the 
legality of this assignment and to question the right of [Appellees] to proceed thereunder 
against [Mr. Kemp]. [Having] dealt with [Appellees] as having properly acquired th[e 
Notes,] . . . [Mr. Kemp is] therefore now estopped from raising the question." Breus, 413 
S.E. 2d 539-40(ellipses in original); quoting Merchants Grocery Co. v. Shawnee Milling 
Co., 86 Ga. App. 848, 852, 72 S.E.2d 797 (1952). Mr. Kemp, admits that he has 
continued to keep the Notes current by making payments to the Appellees after the Notes 
were transferred and securitized. Appellees would be damaged if Mr. Kemp was allowed 
to challenge the transfer and securitization of the Notes after Mr. Kemp has been made 
aware of the transfer and securitization and continued to act in accordance with the terms 
of the Notes. Thus, Mr. Kemp, like the borrower in Breus, is estopped from claiming that 
the transfers and securitization were improper. 
Conclusion 
This Court has previously rejected the exact legal arguments that Mr. Kemp brings 
before it. Specifically, this Court has held that securitization on its own does not affect 
the covenants, obligations and rights in the Notes and Trust Deed on its own. Nor does it 
affect the enforceability of either. Mr. Kemp's own counsel has previously made these 
exact arguments, only to have them rejected by this Court. Because Mr. Kemp's 
securitization argument fails, each of his claims in this lawsuit also fails. Furthermore, 
Mr. Kemp lacks standing to bring this lawsuit because he is not a party to the transaction 
he challenges and he has not identified a potential injury as a result of the transfer and 
securitization of the Notes. Finally, Mr. Kemp is estopped from challenging the transfer 
and securitization of the Notes. For these reasons, this court should affirm and award 
Appellees their costs and fees for having to defend this appeal. 
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